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Abstract
The traditional methodology employed by the judiciary in tax cases leads to narrow defi-
nitional debates separate from a consideration of policy and principle. With each new case we
expect a resolution of fundamental issues and some clarity. But this is rarely achieved and the
uncertainty and ambiguity associated with our tax laws compounds. We need to depart from the
traditional methodology and embrace an approach in which the judiciary expressly acknowledges
policy considerations when deciding hard tax cases. Thus our legal witchdoctors need to em-
brace a new methodology. Such an approach can be demonstrated by reference to recent general
anti-avoidance cases.
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The  traditional methodology employed by  the  judiciary  in  tax cases  leads  to narrow 
definitional debates separate from a consideration of policy and principle.   With each 
new case we expect a resolution of fundamental issues and some clarity.   But this is 
rarely  achieved  and  the  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  associated  with  our  tax  laws 
compounds.     We need  to depart  from  the  traditional methodology and embrace an 
approach in which the  judiciary expressly acknowledges policy considerations when 







An old man  lives  in a village on Tanna, a  remote  island of Vanuatu.     He suffers a 
debilitating illness and is very unwell.   He hears of a great witchdoctor on the other 




The  witchdoctor  is  the  most  revered  in  all  Vanuatu.      His  knowledge  is  the 
accumulation of wisdom handed down to him from his ancestors.     He gives the old 
man  a  special  blend  of  kava  to  drink.      He  smears  his  body  with  the  sap  of  the 
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healthy  tax  system  but  rather  contributing  to  its  demise.      The  overly  legalistic 
approach  to  the  interpretation  of  tax  statutes  naively  assumes  that  the  answer  is 
always to be found in the words of Parliament.     This is a fallacy.     We are in denial 






                                                 
2   N Brooks, ‘The responsibility of judges in interpreting tax legislation’ in Tax Avoidance and 
the Rule of Law edited by GS Cooper, IBFD Publications BV 1997, 93; Y Grbich, ‘Is economics 
any  use  to  tax  lawyers’  (1980)  12 Melbourne University  Law Review  340; Y Grbich,  ‘New 
modalities  in  tax  decision‐making:  applying  European  experience  to  Australia’  (2004)  2 
Ejournal  of Tax Research  125.     Contrast RA McLeod,  ‘An  economic  approach  to  taxation 
avoidance’  (1996)  2  New  Zealand  Journal  of  Taxation  Law  and  Policy  171  who  adopts  an 
economic analysis but proposes a less activist role for the judiciary. 
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My  starting  point  is  that  the  majority  of  difficult  tax  cases  end  up  involving  the 
general anti‐avoidance provision (the ‘GAAR’).   Just as people confined by an illness 
or operation to hospital often are inflicted with secondary infections, this is exactly the 
effect  that  I see  the GAAR having on our  tax system.     GAARs add another  layer of 




of  the  difficulties  raised  by  Australia’s  GAAR,  Part  IVA.4  Whilst  many  of  the 




Thus whilst a  taxpayer might  think  that  they have a choice as  to how  to structure a 
transaction,  in  fact,  there  might  be  only  one  acceptable  alternative  from  a  tax 










attempt  to  force  a  distinction  between  primary  and  secondary  level  purposes  or 
motive and purpose onto the facts.     Furthermore, it is only permissible to draw this 
distinction  from  the objective  evidence, much of which was  initially  created by  the 
taxpayer. 
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into and an  ‘alternative hypothesis’.     However  the courts are currently  tackling  the 
dilemma  that  if  the alternative hypothesis  is equally  tax advantageous  then  the Part 
would seem to have no application. 
 
The nature of  the  relevant  ‘scheme’  is  indeterminable.     Even  the principle,  though 
endorsed in FCT v Peabody,7 that the arrangement identified must be one not ‘robbed 
of all practical meaning’ presented little certainty in its application.     Now it appears 
from Hart  v  FCT8  that  even  this  prescription might  not  be  available.      In  turn,  the 







The  technical detail of  the provision  results  in decisions  that  focus on  the minutiae.   
The  real  focus as  to whether  something  is unacceptable  tax avoidance,  in  the  sense 
that  it  is economically and  socially undesirable,  is emasculated  in  technical analysis 
and semantics. 
 
If you need convincing that the provision is a mess I invite you to read the High 
Court’s latest offering on the subject in Hart and Hill J’s attempt in Macquarie Finance 
Ltd v FCT10 to make sense of it all.   His Honour had great difficulty identifying a 
precedent on the meaning of ‘scheme’ from the High Court decision.   Fortunately for 
His Honour, he was able to avoid having to reach a decided view on the scope of the 
scheme on the facts.   Ultimately, whilst concluding with reluctance that Part IVA, as 
interpreted in Hart, applied, Hill J expressed doubt as to whether this would have 
been Parliament's intention when the Part was enacted.   His Honour’s judgment is a 
reflection of the reality that there is a great degree of uncertainty as to the scope of the 
provision. 
                                                 
7   (1994) 181 CLR 359. 
8    (2004) HCA 26; 2004 ATC 4599. 
9   Hill  J  in Macquarie  Finance  Ltd  v  FCT  [2004]  FCA  1170  sought  to  avoid  this  result  by 
suggesting  that,  notwithstanding  a  narrow  identification  of  the  relevant  scheme,  the 
broader  circumstances  in which  it occurs may be  taken  into  account.     Branson QC has 
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Such is the state of play after almost a quarter of the century.   The legislation is clearly 
inadequate.11  Whilst it is understood that the ATO is content with the decisions they 
are currently achieving it needs to bear in mind the phenomenon that the judiciary 
often react to broad interpretations by subsequently narrowly applying them.   
Furthermore, as the guardian of the administration of the tax laws, the ATO should 
not be satisfied with the current uncertainty for taxpayers that Part IVA generates.   It 
is not sufficient to explain this away by saying that the Part operates on a case-by-case 
basis.   This intimates that we are not to know whether it applies until the highest 
court has ruled on it.   Hardly an effective tax system. 
 
Whilst the primary focus of this article is on Australia, similar observations can be 
made about the New Zealand GAAR.   It is contained in ss BB 3 (1), BG 1, GB 1, with 
important definitions in S OB 1.12  It is well known that it draws heavily from the 
former Australian GAAR in s 260 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. 
 
For the purposes of my argument this is significant in two respects.   Firstly, it means 
that the New Zealand GAAR is similar to Part IVA in primarily focusing on the 
taxpayer’s (not merely incidental) purpose.13  Here lies a major limitation that renders 
the provision potentially subject to the deficiencies in Part IVA referred to above.   In 
particular, it is noteworthy that the Internal Revenue Department (‘IRD’) adopts the 
view that a step in a wider arrangement can be considered separately for the purposes 
of determining whether a tax avoidance purpose is not merely incidental and that an 
arrangement will nevertheless be caught, even though it is capable of explanation by 
reference to ordinary business or family dealings.14 
 
It also means that that the legislative prescription is very vague and open to judicial 
interpretation.   In a similar way that judicial glosses came to characterize the 
interpretation of s 260 such would also appear to be the New Zealand experience.   
                                                 
11   For the same conclusion see the views expressed by Sackville J in ‘Avoiding tax avoidance: 







13   Although reference can also be made to the  ‘effect’ of the arrangement.     This means that 
any tax adviser’s involvement is made relevant. 
14   See Appendix C to the Tax Information Bulletin Vol 1, No 8, February 1990.   With a view to 
clarifying  the  application  of  the  provisions,  the  IRD  issued  an  exposure  draft  on  the 
interpretation  of  the  GAAR  in  September  2004.      This  exposure  draft  arguably  takes  a 
stricter approach  than  the 1990 Bulletin on  these matters.     Notably, Australian cases are 
cited in support of the positions taken. 
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Most notable has been the judiciary's endorsement of a predication test, flirtation with 
a distinction between tax mitigation and tax avoidance (the former apparently not 
being caught by the GAAR), further flirtation with an impropriety test and an ongoing 
debate as to the relevance or otherwise of a choice doctrine.15 
 
Meanwhile government enquiries in the 1990s either proposed amendments along the 
lines of Part IVA or rejected the need for any substantial amendment.16   All this time 
the IRD has effectively ignored the wording of the provision and applied its own 
(relatively conservative) approach.   Notably, this approach gives predominance to the 
purpose of the primary legislation and applies the GAAR in such a way as to ensure 
that a literal reading does not frustrate this purpose.17   
 
My perspective on the New Zealand experience is that, whilst the GAAR has 
presented significant interpretational difficulties when visited by the judiciary,18 the 
opportunity for this has largely been avoided by the IRD’s approach to its application.   
This approach, which seemingly elevates the importance of the purpose of the 
primary legislation over the purpose of the taxpayer, might be referable to the 
mandate to adopt a purposive approach in the Interpretation Act 1999 and its 
predecessors.19  Given this approach it is, in my view, arguable that the New Zealand 
GAAR adds nothing to the analysis other than the potential to obscure and draw the 
focus away from the fundamental issues in an avoidance case.20 
                                                 
15   See the discussion in J Dabner, ‘The spin of a coin – in search of a workable GAAR’ (2000) 3 
Journal of Australian Taxation 232, 243‐4. 




17   See Appendix C  to  the Tax  Information Bulletin Vol 1, No 8, February 1990 and  the recent 
exposure draft. 
18   For a highly critical review of the judicial interpretation of the NZ GAAR (especially by the 
Privy Council)  see Thomas  J  in Commissioner of  Inland Revenue v BNZ  Investments Limited 
(2001) 20 NZTC 17,103. 
19   Discussed below. 
20   In  contrast  to  the  Australian  Part  IVA,  the  New  Zealand  GAAR  catches  arrangements 
which have  either  the purpose or  ‘effect’ of  tax  avoidance.     The  1999 Australian Ralph 
Review of Business Taxation  
  (http://www.rbt.treasury.gov.au/publications/paper4/index.htm) had rejected a proposal to 
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First, there should be an express mandate in the tax legislation requiring the courts to 
interpret the legislation to give effect to its underlying purpose.22  Currently, such a 
mandate exists in the Australian Acts Interpretation Act 1901.23 but the judiciary 
exercises the right to choose between this methodology and more literal interpretation 
rules.   A consistent approach should be required. 
 
Furthermore, the existing purposive approach to interpretation does not allow the 
judiciary to read words into a provision to further its purpose.   A broader purposive 




To assist the judiciary to ascertain the purpose of legislation a drafting technique that 
abandons detailed legislation in favour of statements of broader principle and the use 
of objects clauses should be adopted.24  Much research has been conducted in relation 
to this proposal in recent years and comments last year from the Australian 




tax  system  could be  created  it would be unlikely  to  include Part  IVA as  its  central anti‐
avoidance  provision  but  rather  ought  rely  more  on  a  different  approach  to  statutory 







24   For a discussion of  the New Zealand experience using objects clauses see  ‘In Search of a 
Purpose to our Tax Laws’ (2003) 6 Journal of Australian Taxation 32. 
7
Dabner: Judicial Methodology in Tax Cases




Government suggest that Australia is likely to experiment with this approach in tax 
legislation in the near future.25  
 
As an aside, it is notable that there is almost universal acknowledgement by tax 
academics, at least, that the way to most effectively rid the world of tax avoidance is 
through the structural design of a tax system.   For example, qualifications to general 
principles should be minimised and tax expenditure provisions avoided.   Whilst an 




Currently the judiciary is restricted by the need to find ambiguity in its mandate to 
refer to extrinsic material in order to make sense of legislation.   The type of material 
that may be sighted is also restricted. 
 
A new approach is required.   The rule that Parliament’s purpose is to be found solely 
in the words of a provision should be abandoned.   Thus, the words should no longer 
take precedence but be simply the starting point for the judiciary in its quest to 
identify parliament’s purpose.   Furthermore, the judiciary should be trusted to refer 
to whatever material they consider useful, including oral testimony, and give it the 
appropriate weight. 
                                                 
25   See the Assistant Treasurer Senator Helen Coonan’s address to the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors, Perth, 12 July 2004. 




Krishna,  ‘The  Tension  between  the Westminster  Principle  and Abusive  Tax Avoidance’ 
(1997) 7 Canadian Current Tax 65; 1997 CCT LEXIS 15 and ‘The Illusive Interest Deduction’ 
(1998) 8 Canadian Current Tax 89; 1998 CCT LEXIS 19; RA McLeod, ‘An Economic Approach 
to  Taxation Avoidance’  (1996)  2 New Zealand  Journal  of  Taxation  Law  and  Policy  171; NF 




Swedish  Experiment  with  a  General  Anti‐Avoidance  Rule’  307;  J  Waincymer,  ‘The 
Australian  Tax  Avoidance  Experience  and  Responses:  A  Critical  Review’  247;  CH 
Gustafson,  ‘The politics and practicalities of checking  tax avoidance  in  the United States’ 
349;  M  Brooks  &  J  Head,  ‘Tax  Avoidance:  In  Economics,  Law  &  Public  Choice’  53;  M 
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Currently  there  is  an  inconsistent  application  by  the  judiciary  of  the  principle  of 
whether substance should prevail over form.   It should be made clear that substance 
should  dominate  and  the  inquiry  before  the  court  should  be  how  did  parliament 
intend  this  economic  result  to  be  dealt  with.      Such  a  rule  should  be  particularly 





Opponents of the purposive approach to interpretation argue that often it is 
impossible to determine parliament’s purpose.   Alternatively legislation, particularly 
tax expenditure provisions, may reflect competing purposes. 
 
This is all true.   However, where the purpose(s) of the legislation is obscure or it does 
not assist in resolving the issue at hand, then the judiciary should undertake a policy 
analysis and openly decide the matter by reference to the preferred policy outcome.   
Then, if the government disagrees it is open to parliament to change the legislation, 
but with the benefit of access to an express policy consideration by gifted legal minds. 
Whilst this sounds radical there is a substantial amount of literature supporting a 
more economic approach to deciding tax cases.27  Anti-avoidance cases are infamous 
for their judicial debates over semantic niceties.   This is a huge waste of public 
resources and proceeds on a misguided view that words have a ‘correct’ meaning.   
This is a fallacy.   There are only better argued meanings.   Thus there needs to be 




The above strategies may do little to improve certainty for taxpayers where the 
legislation is complex or poorly drafted.   Proponents of the literal approach to 
interpretation argue that it is unfair to apply an impost on citizens other than by 
reference to express words in the legislation.   This may be true but it is also the 
mantra of tax avoiders. 
 
We need a compromise that recognises that some quite innocent taxpayers may have 
been positively misled by the legislation, especially where the court has adopted a 
broad purposive approach or policy analysis.28  Therefore, the courts should be 
                                                 
27   See above n 2. 
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provided with an expanded discretion to quantify liability by taking into account the 
clarity with which tax policy is expressed and the taxpayer’s conduct.   This could 
extend from simply refraining from entering a costs order through to negative 
penalties or discounts off the tax liability.   It is only at this level that the taxpayer’s 
purpose would be relevant. 
 
Furthermore, a fund should be established to compensate taxpayers who have 
incurred expense arising from their interpretation of what has been held by a court or 
the Tax Policy committee (see below) to be misleading legislation but whose cases did 
not proceed to litigation. 
 
In this way the inherent costs of the imperfections of language could be borne by the 




Furthermore, with a view to reducing uncertainty and the prospect of litigation, a tax 
policy committee should be established with representatives from the revenue 
authority, Treasury, business and the profession.   Its primary role would be to 
enunciate on the perceived policy behind tax legislation or desirable policy direction 
where the existing policy is unclear and to monitor whether tax rulings reflect this 
policy.   Applications could be made to the committee by a taxpayer (following a 
ruling application to the ATO) or by the ATO.   The deliberations of the committee 
would not be binding on courts but would provide highly persuasive evidence of 





There is a substantial body of literature to suggest that taxpayers’ perceptions of 
unfairness and excessive taxation may be factors in their decision to avoid tax.29  
Hopefully the strategies outlined above would go some way towards improving 
views as to fairness.   But we need to go further.   Just as campaigns of the past have 
changed society’s views as to littering, drink driving, exercise, smoking and safe sex 
we need a campaign to persuade taxpayers that they have a moral obligation to pay 
tax in accordance with parliament’s intention.   Tax is the cost of the public goods we 
all enjoy. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
this result in M Burton, ‘The meaning of ‘permanent establishment’ in McDermott Industries 
(Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCA 1044 [2004] 39 CCH Tax Week 844. 
29   For  example,  see  P  Niemirowski,  S  Baldwin  and  AJ  Wearing,  ‘Tax  related  behaviours, 
beliefs,  attitudes  and  values  and  taxpayer  compliance  in  Australia’  (2003)  6  Journal  of 
Australian Taxation 132 and the references cited there. 
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Let us consider an application of this approach to the facts of Hart.   The facts were 
that the taxpayers took out a wealth optimizer split loan product to enable them to 
purchase a home and retain their former residence as an investment property.   The 
product was structured such that in the early years of the loan all repayments were 
directed towards paying off the home loan while allowing the interest on the 
investment property loan to be capitalized (and compound interest imposed).   In 
essence the progressive shift of the loan balance from the residential side of the 
account to the investment side permitted interest on the loan funds used to purchase 
the Harts’ home to be claimed as a tax deduction. 
 
The High Court held (overruling a unanimous Full Federal Court) that the tax benefit 
associated with the loan was subject to Part IVA.   A key reason for leave to appeal to 
the High Court being granted was to clarify the operation of the definition of ‘scheme’ 
for the purposes of Part IVA.   As noted above, the decision has done anything but, as 
the pivotal decision of Callinan J is open to competing interpretations.   One 
interpretation would see the Commissioner’s powers under Part IVA expanded, while 
the alternative interpretation would merely reinforce the status quo that has prevailed 







an  expanded discretion  to quantify a  tax  liability, might  then have apportioned  the 
interest deduction to give effect to their decision. 
 
Alternatively,  the  Court  might  have  considered  the  policy  merits  or  otherwise  of 
permitting the deduction.     On one side, the deduction would encourage  investment 
activity  particularly  in  the  housing  sector  with  all  the  attendant  benefits  for  the 
community.     On  the other hand,  it would  create  a disparity between  taxpayers  in 
similar situations who had not accessed  the wealth optimizer product, at  least until 
such time as they could have refinanced.   Furthermore, there would clearly be a loss 
to  the Revenue  from  the additional  tax deductions.     With  these and other  relevant 




the  wording  of  Part  IVA  that  the  Court  embarked  upon.      Clearly  the  traditional 
11
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methodology  to  approaching  the  decision  has  not  given  the  community  greater 
certainty or enhanced the reputation of the law.   It is argued that it never will. 
 
Another example can be drawn from Macquarie Finance.   This case involved a tax 
effective financing arrangement whereby Macquarie Bank issued stapled securities 
providing holders with preference shares in Macquarie Finance and a beneficial 
interest in unsecured notes.   Under the terms of the issue, holders of the securities 
would receive interest payments, unless certain prescribed events occurred at which 
stage they would be entitled to dividends.   The arrangement permitted Macquarie 
Bank to recognize the capital raised as Tier 1, whilst claiming a tax deduction for the 
payments to service the securities. 
 
In other words, this hybrid arrangement allowed the securities to be counted as equity 
for prudential purposes but with the tax characteristics of debt.   Naturally, the 
decision was being closely watched by the finance sector and had the potential to 
seriously erode government tax revenues. 
 
Hill J reviewed the deductibility of the ‘interest’ in the context of the composite nature 
of the transaction, concluding that the ‘interest’ was capital or of a capital nature.   The 
outgoings were concerned not with the cost of maintaining a loan but rather with the 
cost of raising capital.   Accordingly the amounts were not deductible under s 8-1. 
 
 In the event that he was wrong, his Honour went on to consider the application of 
Part IVA.   As previously observed, his Honour had difficulty in identifying a 
precedent as to the definition of scheme from the High Court judgments in Hart.   In 
the result he took the view that Hart probably stands for the proposition that the 
‘particular form’ of the loan agreement was the scheme.   Adopting this view of the 
relevant scheme he concluded that Part IVA would apply. 
 
 On the approach advocated here the part of his Honour’s judgment dealing with Part 
IVA would have been unnecessary.   His Honour had decided the case in the 
appropriate manner with reference to s 8-1.   His Honour’s finding was effectively an 
acceptance that the substance of the outgoings to the payer were dividends in nature 
rather than interest and, therefore, not deductible. 
 
 Had his Honour any doubt as to this, he could have embarked upon a policy analysis 
as to whether it was desirable for such transactions to proliferate in a tax effective 
manner.    This might have involved obtaining expert evidence on, and considering 
such matters as, the cost to the Revenue and the desirability of encouraging such 
complex transactions with their commercial ramifications and establishment costs as 
against the advantages of enhanced investment activity.    The ultimate focus would 
have been on the economic and social implications for the country.   As always, it was 
12
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open to parliament to subsequently legislate in relation to such arrangements, as 
indeed it has.30 
 
A final illustration, drawn from New Zealand, where a policy analysis by the courts 
may have been particularly appropriate, is the case of Challenge Corporation Limited v 
CIR.31 This decision both applied a GAAR and is New Zealand authority for the 
traditional purposive approach to interpretation. 
 
The case involved the purchase of a loss company during the year in artificial 
circumstances.32 At the time, the legislation only required that companies share 
common ownership at the end of the income year in which a loss was to be grouped.    
 
The litigation at all stages focused on the application of the GAAR and its relationship 
with the loss and grouping provisions.   The Privy Council, in a problematic decision 
that has largely been ignored by the New Zealand courts, allowed the Inland 
Revenue’s appeal on the basis that this was unacceptable ‘tax avoidance’ to be 
contrasted with acceptable ‘tax mitigation’.33 On the other hand, those judges 
supporting the taxpayer’s case accepted that there was no evidence that Parliament’s 
intent was otherwise than to permit the transaction and the specific provisions took 
priority over the GAAR. 
 
The approach advocated here would have the Court focus solely on the purpose of the 
loss and grouping provisions and not be distracted by the nuances of the GAAR.   If 
                                                 
30   See the debt/equity rules in Division 974 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. 
31   [1986] 2 NZLR 513. 
32   For  example,  the  price  of  the  shares  in  the  acquired  loss  companies was  related  to  the 
potential tax savings that Challenge might achieve and the companies never traded again 
after acquisition. 
33   The New Zealand Court of Appeal has  ignored  this distinction  in  favour of applying  the 
Newton v FCT  (1958) 98 CLR 1 predication  test  together with a choice doctrine.     See,  for 
example, Miller v CIR  (1998) 18 NZTC 13,961.     Subsequently,  the Privy Council  in CIR v 
Auckland Harbour Board  (2001) 20 NZTC 17,008 and O’Neil v CIR  (2001) NZTC 17,051  (the 
appeal  from Miller) appears  to have accepted  that  the distinction between mitigation and 
avoidance is problematic in favour of an approach that explores whether there is a tension 
between  the  commercial and  juristic  character of a  transaction,  in which  case  the GAAR 






that  could  have  been  resolved  by  taking  a  substance  over  form  approach, without  any 
reference to the GAAR. 
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no relevant parliamentary intent could be ascertained from all the publicly available 
material, or it was ambiguous, then an adjudication based on the most desirable tax 
policy would be appropriate.   Then the extent to which this decision caught the 
taxpayer by surprise, or it could be concluded the taxpayer’s interpretation of the 
legislation lacked credibility or was unreasonable, would factor into the quantification 








This  suggestion  is  an  attempt  to  compromise  between  the  rights  of  taxpayers  to 




Just  as  the  witchdoctor  was  misguided  in  his  belief  that  the  traditional  remedies 
would  cure  the  old  man’s  illness,  our  lawmakers  labour  under  a  fundamental 
misconception  that  parliament  can  agree  on  a  form  of  words  that  can  provide  an 
answer  for  any  of  the  complex  transactions  that  legislation may  have  to  apply  to.   
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